Time
and Place: Thursday,
May 5, 2005
7:30 to
9:30 PM,
Room (TBA)
Stanford
,
CA
94305
Topic:
Do Prestigious Investment Banks Talk Their Clients
into
Mergers and Acquisitions
Speaker
Bio.: Xiaoying Xie is currently
a Ph. D. candidate in Economics at Stanford University. She also has
a Masters Degree in Legal Studies from Stanford Law School. She
specializes in corporate finance, and law and economics, especially
investment bank issues.
Intro.
of the Talk: We have seen several high-profile investment bank
scandals in recent years. This paper attempts to investigate how
investment banks act in cases of conflicts of interest in mergers
and acquisitions (M&A). I find that there are, statistically and
economically, significant positive investment bank fixed effects on
both the acquisition likelihood and acquisition frequency of equity
underwriting client companies. These positive investment bank fixed
effects are, at least partially, caused by their self interest in
ensuring more deals in order to collect more advisory fees. I also
find that the market has a negative reaction to mergers and
acquisitions in which acquiring companies employ investment banks
with prior underwriting relationship as advisors.
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